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Abstract
We consider a model of decentralized exchange where individuals choose the set of goods they produce.
Specialization involves producing a smaller set of goods and doing it more proÞciently. In doing so, agents
reduce production costs, but also reduce the ease of trading their output. We derive the equilibrium degree of
specialization and examine how it is affected by underlying fundamentals. Due to the existence of a hold-up
problem, individuals specialize too little relative to the social optimum. Introducing money leads to more
specialization relative to barter and increases welfare.
1. Introduction
As Adam Smith recognized long ago, by specializing in production, agents become more proÞcient
and thereby lower production costs. As a result, welfare is improved by having individuals specialize
in the production of goods and then trade with each other. If exchange is centralized agents can
produce a small set of goods to lower production costs, then go to the market and trade. However,
if trade is decentralized, then individuals must be matched with acceptable partners before trade
can occur. In a world of barter, trading generally requires a double coincidence of wants, which is
more likely to occur if agents can produce or store a wider variety of goods. Since specialization of
1We want to thank Randy Wright, Shouyong Shi, Ping Wang, Aleks Berentsen, Dan Kovenock, Andrei Shevchenko,
Dave Wildasin, three anonymous referees and participants at the Cleveland Feds Conference on Monetary Economics
for comments and suggestions.
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production reduces the set of goods an individual has to offer, it reduces the probability of a double
coincidence of wants and trading in a given period. As a result, decentralization makes the issue
of how much to specialize more complicated since agents must trade-off efficiency of production
against the frequency of trade. In short, an agent must decide whether to be a jack of all trades
or a master of one. Our objective in this paper is to analyze an individuals specialization decision
in a decentralized trading environment.
The decision of how much to specialize is further complicated by the existence of money. As
Smith recognized, specialization in production leads to the use of money in trading. However, as
pointed out by Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), the use of money lowers trading risk by allowing trade
to occur in single coincidence matches. Since trading risk is reduced by the use of money, it seems
intuitive that agents would respond to this by specializing more on the margin in order to lower
costs of production. But if so, under what conditions? In addition, once money is introduced, does
an increase in the steady state money stock have any further effects on specialization? And Þnally,
does the introduction of money improve welfare?
In this paper we study agents specialization choices in both a barter and a monetary economy.
We then determine if, and under what conditions, the existence of money leads to greater spe-
cialization in production. We use a random matching model with divisible goods and indivisible
money as in Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi (1995). We allow agents to choose which goods they
produce, ranging from a single good to the entire set of goods in the economy. Specialization is
deÞned to mean a reduction in the set of goods an agent can produce. It is assumed that the total
and marginal cost of producing a given quantity of output declines as agents specialize. Prices and
terms of trade are determined via a simple match-dependent bargaining protocol: Nash bargaining
in barter matches, and buyer-take-all in monetary matches. Finally, we compare the individuals
choice of specialization to that of a social planner.
Our work complements the studies of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Shi (1997) and Reed (1998),
who have examined how specialization affects market participation in search-theoretic models of
money.2 On the contrary, our model focuses on the relationship between specialization and produc-
2 In Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) production is stochastic; by choosing a narrower production set (specializing),
the frequency of production rises. In Shi (1997) the agent can costly produce his desired consumption good or
costlessly produce a good to be traded for his desired consumption good (specialization). In Reed (1998) an agent
who specializes more spends less time maintaining her production skills, and more time in the market trading. While
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tion efficiency. Furthermore, we expand the scope of analysis relative to earlier work by relaxing
the assumption of indivisible goods and Þxed terms of trade. In this way, we can examine how
specialization affects individual output, marginal costs of production, terms of trade and prices.
We also study how risk aversion affects specialization.
To summarize our results, we show existence and uniqueness of the optimal degree of specializa-
tion in both barter and monetary economies. In a barter economy we show that agents specialize
more as search frictions fall and risk aversion falls. We Þnd that the individual choice of specializa-
tion is generally inefficient because of the existence of a trading externality and a pricing distortion.
When money is introduced into the economy, specialization increases lowering the probability of
barter matches. While agents take into account their surplus loss from less frequent barter matches,
they do not consider the surplus loss of their trading partner. Furthermore, because terms of trade
are determined by bilateral bargaining, the individuals choice of specialization creates a hold-up
problem and thus a pricing distortion. By specializing less than average, an individual can appro-
priate more of the surplus from trade. As a result of these two effects individual specialization
choices are not socially optimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 describes pricing protocols and value functions. Section 4 studies equilibria in a barter and a
monetary economy. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Environment
Time is continuous with consumption and production occurring at discrete points. There is a
[0,1] continuum of inÞnitely-lived agents and perishable good types both of which are uniformly
distributed along a unit circle. In the ensuing discussion a point along the circle is taken to represent
a particular good type or a particular agent type. Individuals discount future utility at rate r > 0.
Agents have specialized preferences. A representative agent i derives utility from consumption
of those commodities lying along an arc going from point i (her location along the circle) to i+ x,
where x ∈ (0, 1) ∀i. Consumption of quantity qj > 0 of good j provides utility u(qj) > 0 to
individual i only if j lies in her consumption set and if it is not her own production. It yields zero
we focus on agents decisions to produce a variety of goods, an alternative would be to acquire a broader set of goods
to increase the frequency of exchange, an idea explored by Shevchenko (1999).
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utility otherwise.3 Additionally u0(qj) > 0, u00(qj) < 0, u000(qj) > 0, and u(0) = 0. For tractability
we consider u(q) = qσ, σ ∈ (0, 1) .
2.1 Endowments, Production, and the BeneÞts of Specialization
Agent i is initially assigned a production location k on the circle (corresponding to good k)
randomly and independently of her type. Following that, i may choose to expand her production
set to an interval of length yi on an arc centered around point k. The resulting production set is
[k−yi/2, k+yi/2] where yi ∈ [0, 1]. A larger yi implies a broader production set meaning individual
i specializes less. For instance in standard search models agents are assumed to be able to produce
only one type of good, which corresponds to yi = 0 in our model. We assume that this specialization
choice is made at the beginning of life, and cannot be changed. The agent chooses the length of
the interval, yi, to maximize her expected discounted lifetime utility from consumption.
Production is costly and is associated with a utility loss that depends on the extent of special-
ization, yi, and the quantity produced, q. It is assumed that for a given yi, the disutility associated
with the production of q units of any good is c(q, yi) ≥ 0, a twice continuously differentiable func-
tion such that c(0, yi) = 0, cq(q, yi) > 0, cqq(q, yi) ≥ 0. We further assume that for all yi ∈ [0, 1],
there exists 0 <q< ∞ such that u(q) = c(q, yi), and u0(0) > cq(0, yi). That is, a single (or dou-
ble) coincidence match can always generate some positive surplus, no matter how specialized the
economy; furthermore, the amount produced and exchanged in every trade match is Þnite.
We assume that cyi(q, yi) > 0, cyiyi(q, yi) ≥ 0, cyi(0, yi) = 0,and cqyi(q, yi) > 0. Our assumptions
on the cost function capture the idea of proÞciency in production  the Þrst inequality shows that
increasing the set of production goods raises the total cost of any good produced by agent i while
the second inequality assumes that the marginal cost of producing any good is also increasing in
yi. For tractability we consider c(q, y) = (1 + y)q.
A fraction M ∈ [0, 1] of individuals initially receives one unit of indivisible Þat money which
can be freely discarded. We assume that individuals cannot store more than one unit of money but
we do allow for barter trade to occur in all double coincidence matches. That is, regardless of an
agents money holdings, individuals may produce and trade goods. In this way, introducing money
3In search models of money it is generally assumed that individuals cannot consume own production to motivate
the need for exchange. In our environment, this creates additional complications in deriving the probabilities of
exchange. To avoid them we normalize to zero the utility from autarkic consumption.
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expands the set of trading opportunities.4
2.2 Exchange
Agents meet bilaterally and randomly according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α, and
we let α = 1 by normalizing the time interval. Only one transaction per date can be carried out.
Trading histories are private information but types and actions within each match are observable.
Given her initial production location, individual i0s optimal choice of specialization, yi, has
implications for her probability of exchange. Since we study stationary and symmetric equilibria,
let Y denote the length of all other agents production sets, taken as given by agent i.
Now consider the probability that someone is able to produce something that agent i likes. This
depends on both x and Y as follows. Any producer whose location is inside the arc [i, i + x] can
produce for agent i. Furthermore, producers located on the arcs extending to the left of point i,
[i−Y/2, i], and to the right of point i+x, [i+x, i+x+Y/2] can also produce for i. Combining these
three sets of producers, the proportion of agents able to produce for i is x+ Y. Since a coincidence
of wants will always occur for all Y ≥ 1− x the ex-ante probability that a randomly encountered
agent can produce i0s consumption good is
p(Y ) =
 x+ Y if Y ≤ 1− x1 otherwise. (1)
Similarly, the probability that a randomly encountered agent will want to consume a good produced
by agent i is
p(yi) =
 x+ yi if yi ≤ 1− x1 otherwise. (2)
Given that production and consumption locations are randomly, independently and uniformly dis-
tributed across individuals, the ex-ante probability of double coincidence of wants in a match is
p(Y )p(yi).
The sequence of events for a representative trader is as follows. At the beginning of time she
chooses the extent of specialization. Subsequently she begins her search process, meeting other
agents pairwise and randomly over time. Contingent on a match, she bargains. If this leads to
trade, production and consumption take place after which she searches anew.
4This is unlike most earlier search models where money crowds out valuable barter trades thereby creating an
artiÞcial cost that makes money less valuable. See Rupert et al. (2001) for a discussion of the different approaches.
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3. Symmetric Stationary Equilibria
We study stationary rational expectations equilibria, where symmetric Nash strategies are adopted,
and identical agents use identical time-invariant strategies. Thus, without loss of generality, in what
follows we omit the subscript i in the specialization choice of agent i. Each individual takes as given
the extent of specialization of all others, Y, when considering her choice of y. Furthermore, the beliefs
over strategies are identical across individuals, and agents correctly evaluate the surplus derived in
each possible transaction. In what follows we study a barter economy and a monetary economy.
When analyzing monetary equilibria, we focus on equilibria where money is fully acceptable.
3.1 Bargaining
Consider a match where trade is feasible. The two agents can choose to barter or to engage in
monetary exchange depending on their holdings of money and the existence of a single or double
coincidence of wants. It is assumed that the terms of trade in a stationary equilibrium must satisfy
the generalized Nash bargaining protocol. In matches where barter takes place both parties have an
equal bargaining weight. In matches where money is exchanged we assume buyers make take-it-or
leave-it offers to sellers. This follows much of the literature, although one could use generalized
Nash bargaining instead (see Rupert et al. (2001)).
The assumed bargaining protocols have the virtue of making the analysis quite tractable because
they have two important implications for the equilibrium pattern of exchange. First, take-it-or-
leave-it offers imply that the buyers degree of specialization cannot affect the quantity she expects
to buy with money, denoted by Qm. Her specialization choice can only affect the quantity she
expects to sell for money, denoted by qm. Second, since surplus is earned by both parties only
when barter occurs, monetary exchange will take place in equilibrium only in single coincidence
matches. Consequently, barter will be chosen whenever feasible.5
Consider a double coincidence match. The quantity of output received by the representative
agent in the match, Q, and the quantity she produces q, are determined via a Nash bargaining
process. Since specialization choices are made at the beginning of life, y and Y are taken as given
when two agents bargain. Recall also that both parties in the match take as given the value functions
5This is almost certainly true for any bargaining weights not just buyer-take-all (see the proof in Rupert et al.
(2001)).
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and the quantities exchanged in all other matches, Q. Under this conjecture, the quantities traded
must satisfy6
maxq,Q[u(q)− c(Q,Y )][u(Q)− c(q, y)]
s.t. u(q) > c(Q,Y ) and u(Q) > c(q, y).
Thus, the equilibrium quantities must satisfy the Þrst order conditions:
u0(q)[u(Q)− c(q, y)]− cq(q, y)[u(q)− c(Q,Y )] = 0
u0(Q)[u(q)− c(Q,Y )]− cQ(Q,Y )[u(Q)− c(q, y)] = 0.
(3)
In equilibrium these quantities depend on y and Y so we denote them by Q(y, Y ) and q (y, Y ),
omitting the arguments when understood. Under the assumed properties of u(Q) and c(Q,Y ), it
is easy to show that if y > Y then Q > q, and vice versa.
Under the assumed preferences and cost functions (3) implies:
q(y, Y ) = Q(Y ) ·
³
1+Y
1+y
´ 1
1−σ2
Q(y, Y ) = q(y, Y ) ·
³
1+Y
1+y
´ −1
1+σ
(4)
where
Q (Y ) =
µ
σ
1 + Y
¶ 1
1−σ
(5)
and satisÞes
u0(Q)− cQ(Q,Y ) = 0. (6)
In a symmetric equilibrium, y = Y , q = Q = Q (Y ) ,thus barter trades are efficient. The symmetric
equilibrium Q(Y ) is unique, bounded above (by a positive number) and below (by zero) and it is a
decreasing function of Y (we omit the argument, when understood). As the degree of specialization
rises (Y falls) a higher quantity of goods is traded because marginal production costs are lower.
A change in σ affects the marginal utility of consumption and since the Nash bargaining protocol
implies that marginal utility must be a constant for our functional forms, u0(Q) = 1 + Y , then Q
must also change.
Now consider a single coincidence match where an agent with money is the buyer and an agent
without is the seller. Let Vm(y, Y ) and V0(y, Y ) denote the stationary expected lifetime utility of
6We assume that the threat point is equal to the continuation value. However, other threat points could be used.
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an agent who holds money and an agent who does not. The assumed bargaining protocol implies
that the equilibrium quantities must satisfy:
Vm(Y, Y )− c(Qm, Y )− V0(Y, Y ) = 0
Vm(y, Y )− c(qm, y)− V0(y, Y ) = 0
(7)
The Þrst line determines the quantity agent i receives from an arbitrary seller for money while the
second line determines how much she produces for money. In equilibrium these quantities depend
on y and Y , and are denoted Qm (Y ) and qm(y, Y ), omitting the arguments when understood. We
let qm = Qm = 0 correspond to a non-monetary equilibrium. In a symmetric equilibrium, y = Y,
qm(Y ) = Qm(Y ).7
3.2 Value Functions
Since all double coincidence matches lead to barter trade in equilibrium, the value functions
must satisfy:
rV0(y, Y ) = p(Y )p(y)[u(Q(y, Y ))− c(q(y, Y ), y)]
+M [1− p(Y )]p(y)[Vm(y, Y )− c(qm(y, Y ), y)− V0(y, Y )]
(8)
rVm(y, Y ) = p(Y )p(y)[u(Q(y, Y ))− c(q(y, Y ), y)]
+(1−M)p(Y )[1− p(y)][V0(y, Y ) + u(Qm(Y ))− Vm(y, Y )].
(9)
Equation (8) shows that an individual without money will barter with probability p(Y )p(y) and
will sell for money in a single coincidence meeting with a money-holder who desires her good with
probabilityM [1−p(Y )]p(y). Equation (9) is the expected ßow return to a money holder. The Þrst
term in (9) is the expected payoff from engaging in a barter trade while the second term is the payoff
from paying with cash in a single coincidence match. Note that greater individual specialization
(lower value of y) increases the probability of a single coincidence match (1−M)p(Y )[1−p(y)] but
lowers the probability of double coincidence matches p(Y )p(y).
7 It can now be veriÞed that in a symmetric equilibrium barter would be strictly preferred not only by the potential
seller, but also by the potential buyer. This is because the equilibrium surplus guaranteed by barter, u(Q)−c(Q,Y ), is
larger than the equilibrium surplus generated from purchasing with money, u(Qm)−(Vm−V0), i.e. u(Qm)−c(Qm, Y ) <
u(Q)− c(Q,Y ) ∀Qm 6= Q. This is because u(q)− c(q, Y ) is strictly concave in q, reaching a maximum at q = Q.
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Expressions (8)-(9) show why we explicitly denote the value from trading as a function of Y
and y: the expected net payoff in trade matches, expectations regarding the frequency of trade,
and the expectations regarding the quantities traded all depend on y and Y .
Note that money has no value in a fully diversiÞed economy, since there are no single coincidence
matches when Y ≥ 1 − x, hence Vm = V0. Similarly, money is valueless when M = 1, due to the
inventory restrictions. Hence, when we study monetary equilibria, we consider Y ∈ [0, 1− x) and
M < 1, without loss of generality. We next characterize the equilibrium quantity Qm(Y ).
Lemma 1. Suppose y = Y is a symmetric monetary equilibrium. Then Qm is unique and it must
satisfy
u (Qm)µ (Y )− c (Qm, Y ) = 0 (10)
with 0 < µ (Y ) < 1 and u (Qm) > c(Qm, Y ). Also, limY→1−xQm = limM→1Qm = 0, and if
c (Q,Y ) = Q (1 + Y ) then Qm (Y ) is strictly concave in Y , with maximum at Y = max
©
0, 12 − x
ª
.
Lemma 1 has an interesting implication. Using (10) under the assumed functional forms:
Qm(Y ) =
µ
µ(Y )
1 + Y
¶ 1
1−σ
(11)
where µ(y, Y ) = (1−M)p(Y )[1−p(y)]r+(1−M)p(Y )[1−p(y)] and µ (Y ) ≡ µ (y, Y ) |y=Y .
3.3 The Specialization Choice of the Individual.
The representative agent must choose the extent of her specialization before the random dis-
tribution of money occurs. This initial choice is Þnal. In doing so she takes as given the expected
degree of specialization of all others. thus, the individual chooses y to maximize her ex-ante ßow
return from trade denoted by
W (y, Y ) = (1−M)rV0(y, Y ) +MrVm(y, Y ).
Upon substitution of (7), (8) and (9), and using Lemma 1:
W (y, Y ) = p(Y )p(y)[u(Q(y, Y )− c(q(y, Y ), y)] + rMµ(y, Y )u(Qm(Y )) (12)
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To study the individuals choice of y, it is necessary to differentiate W (y, Y ) with respect to y:
Wy(y, Y ) = p(Y )p
0(y) [u(Q (y, Y ))− c(q (y, Y ) , y)]− p(Y )p(y)cy(q (y, Y ) , y)
+p(Y )p(y) [u0(Q(y, Y ))Qy(y, Y )− cq(q(y, Y ), y)qy(y, Y )]
+rMµy(y, Y )u(Qm(Y ))
(13)
where Qy(y, Y ) =
∂Q(y,Y )
∂y , qy(y, Y ) =
∂q(y,Y )
∂y . The effect of an increase in y on the agents expected
lifetime utility, given that everyone else is expected to choose Y, affects both the value of barter
trades and money trades. The Þrst three terms in (13) correspond to the effects on barter matches
from being less specialized. The Þrst term reßects the beneÞt of being able to produce more types
of goods, which increases the probability of a double coincidence match, if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 − x. If
y > 1− x, however, this matching beneÞt vanishes since p0(y) = 0, and therefore Wy(y, Y ) has a
discontinuity at y = 1 − x. The second term measures the increased marginal cost of producing
more types of goods.
The third term captures how the choice of specialization affects the expected terms of trade
in each match via a hold-up problem. Recall that the initial choice of specialization is Þnal,
but it takes place before any transaction has occurred. Thus, the choice of y is effectively an
irreversible investment in production technology. A hold-up problem occurs when agents are not
able to appropriate the full rents of their investment, thereby creating a disincentive to invest.
In our model y corresponds to the choice of investing in the efficiency of the agents production
technology, where higher y implies less investment in technology. Thus, a hold-up problem arises in
barter matches. In monetary matches no hold-up problem arises because of the bargaining protocol
selected. Because the buyer takes the whole surplus, Qm does not depend on y, but only on Y.
Sellers recognize that they will never earn any surplus, no matter what y they select, hence the
holdup problem does not exist in monetary trades.
The introduction of money allows trade to occur in single coincidence matches, and the last line
of (13) shows that increased diversiÞcation negatively affects the value of these trades, since µy < 0.
The reason is simple. While increasing y raises the probability of double coincidence matches, it
also reduces the occurrence of single coincidence matches, and thus the value of holding money.
This is the only relevant effect, since in equilibrium an increase in y does not affect the surplus
obtained by acquiring money since it is always zero.
To study the individuals choice of specialization we need to consider the second derivative of
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W (y, Y ). Under the assumed functional forms, we can prove a very useful lemma.
Lemma 2. Let u(q) = qσ and c(q, y) = q(1 + y). Given Y, (i) if y > 1 − x then Wy(y, Y ) < 0,
(ii) if Wy(0, Y ) ≤ 0 then Wy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y, (iii) if Wy(1− x, Y ) ≥ 0 then Wy(y, Y ) > 0 ∀y, (iv) if
Wy(y, Y ) = 0 for some y ∈ (0, 1−x), then Wyy(y, Y ) < 0, and (v) u0(Q)Qy(y, Y )−cq(q, y)qy(y, Y ) >
0 ∀y, Y.
This has three important implications. First, since Wy(y, Y ) < 0 for y > 1−x, we can focus on
W (y, Y ) as a continuous function deÞned on [0, 1− x]× [0, 1− x], with no loss in generality when
studying symmetric equilibria. This is because no individual beneÞt can be obtained by diversifying
beyond 1 − x. The second implication is that there is a unique y that maximizes W (y, Y ), ∀Y .
Furthermore, the individuals optimal production set, denoted y∗, can be fully characterized by
sole consideration of (13). SpeciÞcally, given some Y :
y∗ =

1− x ⇔ Wy(1− x, Y ) ≥ 0
y ⇔ Wy(y, Y ) = 0
0 ⇔ Wy(0, Y ) ≤ 0
(14)
where y ∈ (0, 1− x). Finally, since u0(Q)Qy − cq(q, y)qy > 0, the holdup problem gives agents an
incentive to specialize less.
DeÞnition of Equilibrium. A symmetric, stationary, monetary equilibrium is a list {V0, Vm, y, q, qm}
such that (i) {V0, Vm} satisfy (8)-(9), (ii) q = q(y, Y ) and Q = Q(y, Y ) satisfy (3), qm = qm(y, Y )
and Qm = Qm(Y ) satisfy (7), Qm(Y ) > 0, and (iii) y = Y = y∗ satisÞes (14).
In the ensuing analysis we let Yb and Ym denote the symmetric equilibrium values of special-
ization in the barter equilibrium and the monetary equilibrium respectively, letting Yi, i = b,m,
denote an element of (0, 1− x). We can study the barter economy by setting M = 0 in (12) and
(13), which allows us to compare the choice of specialization in a barter economy to that chosen in
a monetary economy.
3.4 The Specialization Choice of a Social Planner.
To discuss the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium we consider the specialization choice of
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a social planner who treats agents symmetrically and takes the matching technology and bargaining
protocols as given. The planner chooses a common Y in order to maximize the expected lifetime
utility of a representative individual. DeÞne his objective function by:
Ws(Y ) = (1−M)rV0(Y ) +MrVm(Y )
= p(Y )2 [u(Q(Y ))− c(Q(Y ), Y )]
+p(Y )(1− p(Y ))(1−M)M [u(Qm(Y ))− c(Qm(Y ), Y )]
an expression equivalent to (12) when y = Y, where Q(Y ) satisÞes (6), and Qm(Y ) satisÞes (10).8
The planners equilibrium choice of Y must maximizeWs(Y ). The necessary Þrst order condition
is:
∂Ws(Y )
∂Y = p(Y )2[u(Q(Y ))− c(Q(Y ), Y )]− p(Y )2cY (Q,Y )
+(1−M)M(1− 2p(Y ))[u(Qm(Y ))− c(Qm(Y ), Y )]
+(1−M)Mp(Y )(1− p(Y ))∂[u(Qm(Y ))−c(Qm(Y ),Y )]∂Y
(15)
The Þrst line in (15) corresponds to what the planner would face in a barter economy. The Þrst
term reßects the social beneÞt of less specialization, while the second term reßects its costs. This
trade-off is essentially the same as that faced by the private individual. However, the social marginal
beneÞt of a higher Y , 2 [u(Q)− c(Q,Y )] , is larger than the private marginal beneÞt, u(Q)−c(Q,Y ),
because of a trading externality. When lowering her degree of specialization (raising y), the agent
increases the probability of a double coincidence match and gains some surplus from additional
trades. However, she ignores the gains everyone else receives from trading with her. Since the
barter quantities are efficient, by the envelope theorem the planners selection of Y does not affect
the bartered quantities. Thus, the holdup problem arising from the choice of specialization creates
a price distortion that the planner wants to avoid.
The remaining components of (15) correspond, respectively, to changes in the occurrence and the
magnitude of the surplus in monetary transactions induced by an increase in Y . First, the planner
recognizes that less specialization makes single coincidence matches, hence monetary exchange,
less likely. Individuals do not take this into account since they expect to receive no surplus when
they sell for money. The resulting inefficiency encourages over-specialization relative to the social
8We have substituted p(Y )(1 − p(Y ))(1 −M)M [u(Qm(Y )) − c(Qm(Y ), Y )] for rMµ(Y )u(Qm(Y )) using Lemma
1.
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optimum.9 Second, the planner can affect the surplus generated in monetary exchanges since the
real price of money, Qm(Y ), depends on the equilibrium specialization level. A buyer, however,
cannot do so due to the nature of the bargaining protocol. The resulting inefficiency distorts the
choice of specialization depending on (i) how Qm is expected to differ from the surplus-maximizing
quantity (above, equal, or below) and (ii) the parameter x, which affects how Qm reacts to a change
in Y (see Lemma 1).
In the ensuing analysis we will denote the planners choice of specialization by Y ∗b for the case
of a barter equilibrium and Y ∗m for the case of a monetary equilibrium, letting Y ∗i , i = b,m, denote
an element of (0, 1− x).
Using (15) with M ∈ {0, 1} it is easy to show that in a barter economy:
Y ∗b =

0 ⇔ ∂Ws(0)∂Y ≤ 0
Y ∗b ⇔ ∂Ws(
Y ∗b )
∂Y = 0
1− x ⇔ ∂Ws(1−x)∂Y ≥ 0
where for the assumed functional forms Y ∗b =
σ(2+x)−2
2−3σ , an element of (0, 1 − x) if and only if
σ > 4−2x5−2x .
For the monetary equilibrium withM ∈ (0, 1) it is more difficult to provide a complete analytical
characterization of Y ∗m because changes in specialization affect both prices and trading probabilities.
It is easy to show, however, that if Y ∗m is an equilibrium, then Y ∗m < Y ∗b for allM ∈ (0, 1) , whenever
Qm(Y
∗
b ) ≈ Q(Y ∗b ), that is when the quantities traded in money matches are efficient.10 Hence, the
planner would choose greater specialization in a monetary economy relative to a barter economy
when money is priced efficiently.
4. Equilibria
In this section we examine the effect that the hold-up problem has on the equilibrium choice of
specialization and how the introduction of money affects specialization, terms of trade and welfare.
4.1 Barter Equilibria
9The magnitude of this effect is clearly sensitive to the choice of bargaining protocol. It would be reduced if sellers
received some trade surplus.
10Since r inßuences Ym only through its effect on Qm and Q, we can Þnd a value of r such that µ (Y ) = σ and
Qm/Q = 1.
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Consider the benchmark case of a non-monetary economy by setting M = 0. Using (13):
Wy(y, Y ) = p(Y )
©
u(Q)− c(q, y)− p(y)cy(q, y) + p(y)
£
u0(Q)Qy − cq(q, y)qy
¤ª
(16)
The next Lemma discusses existence and uniqueness of a symmetric barter equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Let u(q) = qσ and c(q, y) = q(1 + y). A symmetric barter equilibrium always exists,
and it is unique. Yb can be interior depending on preferences and trading frictions. SpeciÞcally:
Yb =

1− x ⇔ σ ≤
q
2−x
3−x
Yb ⇔ σ ∈
³q
2−x
3−x ,
q
1
1+x
´
0 ⇔ σ ≥
q
1
1+x .
(17)
where Yb falls in x.
The existence of corner or interior solutions depends on the relative magnitudes of σ and x. In
particular, (5) and (16) imply Yb =
1−σ2(1+x)
2σ2−1 . As illustrated in Figure 1, expanding the desired
set of consumption goods (increasing x) makes trade easier which entices individuals to specialize
more. The parameter σ also affects Yb because σ captures two distinct effects: it determines the
degree of relative risk aversion, 1 − σ, and the magnitude of the surplus from trade of a given
quantity and level of specialization. It follows that an increase in σ is associated with a lower
degree of relative risk aversion. Since specialization increases the risk of not trading, lower risk
aversion induces agents to specialize more. At the same time, a higher σ lowers the surplus from
trade because utility is lower for all Q (since Q ≤ 1). Thus a smaller surplus from trade induces
agents to specialize more to lower the costs of production and increase the surplus from trade.
For a given x, if agents are sufficiently risk averse (σ small) they will choose to fully diversify
their production abilities, Yb = 1 − x. This implies that trade takes place in every match but
the quantities exchanged are small due to high marginal production costs. If risk aversion is low,
agents specialize completely, Yb = 0. Trade is less frequent but involves larger quantities. For
moderate degrees of risk aversion some specialization occurs but it is not complete, Yb ∈ (0, 1− x).
Interestingly, if individuals are very particular about the goods they desire (x small), complete
specialization will almost never occur. Finally, substituting Yb in Q (Y ) we obtain the equilibrium
quantity as a function of the parameters of the economy.
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However, the private choice of specialization is socially inefficient for two reasons: (i) agents
are unable to coordinate their actions and (ii) the existence of a holdup problem. In particular,
the economy is under -specialized in equilibrium, relative to the socially desirable outcome. This is
obvious by comparing Y ∗b to Yb, and it is proved below.
Lemma 4. Let u(q) = qσ and c(q, y) = q(1 + y). The symmetric barter equilibrium is inefficient,
and such that Yb ≥ Y ∗b .
The intuition is simple. A social planner would not want to choose Y to distort the terms of
trade. However, the individual wants to do so because by under-specializing she can improve the
terms of trade she faces in every match to the detriment of her future trade partners. This is so
because, as shown in Lemma 2, u0(Q)Qy−cq(q, y)qy > 0. Note that there is still the trade externality
discussed before, that tends to push Yb below the efficient level. Although these distortions have
opposing effects on the individual choice of specialization, the Þrst dominates and leads to the
inefficiency result.
4.2. Monetary Equilibria
We now let M ∈ (0, 1) to study monetary equilibria and the effects of monetary trades on the
equilibrium choice of specialization, welfare and compare it to the planners outcome. Our main
results are contained in the following Lemma and proposition:
Lemma 5. Let u(q) = qσ and c(q, y) = q(1 + y). A symmetric monetary equilibrium always exists
if M ∈ (0, 1) such that:
Ym =
 0 or Ym if σ <
q
1
1+x
0 if σ ≥
q
1
1+x
where Ym ∈ (0, Yb) approaches Yb as M → 0, 1. If σ <
q
1
1+x and M is sufficiently small, then
Ym = Ym.
Proposition 1. Let u(q) = qσ and c(q, y) = q(1 + y). The barter economy cannot be more
specialized than the monetary economy, i.e. Ym ≤ Yb.
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Relative to the case of a barter economy, it is now more difficult to determine conditions under
which an interior solution exists, or is unique. When the money supply is small, however, it is
straightforward to prove that a unique monetary equilibrium always exists. The proof exploits
Lemma 3 and makes use of the fact that W (y, Y ) is continuous in M. Moreover, if the equilibrium
is interior, the degree of specialization falls in x as it does in the barter case.
The fundamental result is that when some diversiÞcation takes place in equilibrium, the degree
of specialization in a monetary economy is always strictly greater than that of a barter economy,
i.e. Ym < Yb. The main implication is that agents always specialize to some extent in any monetary
equilibrium since Ym < 1 − x . This makes sense because there are no trading frictions in a fully
diversiÞed economy. Hence money cannot be valued as a medium of exchange. Second, when
liquidity is scarce, adding more liquidity improves the extent of specialization. Money encourages
specialization, relative to a barter economy, because increased diversiÞcation reduces the probability
of single coincidence matches and thus the usefulness of money. Consequently, diversiÞcation has
an additional marginal cost in the monetary economy relative to a barter economy.
The incentive to specialize more in the monetary economy is the result of changes in the un-
derlying trading uncertainty faced by individual agents. In the absence of money, by diversifying
production an individual can self-insure against the intrinsic trading risk stemming from the imper-
fect matching technology. However, the premium for this self-insurance is a higher marginal cost
of production. The introduction of money alters the trading environment, which in turn affects
the agents decision to self-insure on the margin. By allowing trade in single coincidence matches,
money expands the set of trading opportunities thereby reducing individual trading risk. In short,
money serves as a form of social trading insurance. The provision of this social trading insurance
reduces the agents incentive to self-insure against trading risk, which on the margin takes the form
of increased specialization in production. Thus, the introduction of money creates a classic moral
hazard problem  when provided with insurance, agents reduce the extent to which they self-insure
against the bad outcome.
With the introduction of money, as in the barter case, agents will tend to under-specialize
relative to the social optimum.
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Proposition 2. Let u(q) = qσ and c(q, y) = q(1 + y). The symmetric monetary equilibrium is
generally inefficient, and such that Ym ≥ Y ∗m if M is close to 0 or 1. Furthermore, for M close to
0 and 1, welfare is higher in the monetary economy than in the barter economy.
Due to the analytical complexity of the model, the results contained in the proposition are
proved for a subset of the possible initial money supplies, namely those that render the monetary
economy sufficiently similar to a barter economy. Alternatively, they can be proved for any para-
meterization in which the quantities produced in equilibrium are sufficiently similar across matches.
The intuition developed in Proposition 2, however, carries over to more general parameterizations.
This is illustrated in the following section, by means of numerical simulations. In it, we also il-
lustrate how changes in the money stock affect the equilibrium choice of specialization, traded
quantities and welfare.
4.3 A Numerical Illustration.
We provide an illustration of the workings of the model using Figures 2-4. We have para-
meterized preferences by setting σ = 0.82 and x = 0.1, so that the choice of specialization is
interior in both the barter and the monetary economy. In doing so, we have also chosen r such
that Qm(Y ∗m) = Q(Y ∗m) when M = 0. This allows us to see how the trading externality and the
hold-up problem affect the ratio Qm(Ym)/Q(Ym) relative to the planners welfare maximizing ratio
Qm(Y
∗
m)/Q(Y
∗
m) = 1, when M = 0. Given our other parameter values, this led us to set r = .0457.
In Figure 2 we plot the equilibrium production sets for the planner, (Y ∗b , Y
∗
m), and for the
agents, (Yb, Ym). The equilibrium value of Y is always above the planners choice. The basic result
of the paper, introducing money leads to an increase in specialization, is also evident for both the
individual and the planners choices. Furthermore, as the economy becomes increasingly liquid,
the equilibrium choice of specialization decreases and converges to the barter equilibrium choice as
M → 1.
Figure 3 shows how quantities traded in money and barter matches change as the initial liquidity
in the economy changes. With exogenous production specialization, the quantity traded in barter
matches will be the same regardless of the amount of liquidity in the economy and the quantity
traded in money matches declines as the money stock increases. In contrast, we Þnd that introducing
money causes both Q and Qm to rise due to the productivity gains from specialization. As M → 1
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Q falls back to the level in the barter equilibrium and Qm eventually goes to zero as moneys value
as a medium of exchange falls. Despite the inefficiencies associated with the choice of specialization,
we Þnd the same patterns for different levels of liquidity when the choice of specialization is made by
the social planner. Due to the hold-up problem, however, we Þnd that the equilibrium quantities
in both types of matches are much lower than in the planned economy. This occurs because
individuals under-specialize relative to the planners choice and therefore the level of productivity
in equilibrium is too low.
Figure 4 shows the behavior of welfare. Despite the inefficiencies linked to the matching exter-
nality and the hold-up problem, we do Þnd that introducing money raises welfare. This occurs in
both the uncoordinated and planned economies. We also observe that welfare is higher when Y is
selected by the planner rather than privately. Finally, these results conÞrm the typical Þnding of
search-theoretic models that money promotes welfare even when specialization is endogenous.
5. Concluding Comments
By endogenizing the choice of production specialization we have found several interesting results.
First, the typical assumption of complete production specialization used in most monetary search
models may not be individually or socially optimal. Second, the individual choice of specialization
is generally inefficient because of the existence of a trading externality and a pricing distortion
arising from a hold-up problem. Finally, introducing money increases specialization and welfare.
We have demonstrated how the implementation of a simple trading institution (money) alters
the incentives to specialize in production and consequently the level of output and terms of trade.
Since an inability to coordinate exists in this economy, a natural question is how to amend it.
Private agents may resolve the problem by developing alternative trading arrangements such as
middlemen, stores, or production cooperatives. As these trading institutions develop, trading
frictions fall which, according to our model, will entice agents to specialize further since they do
not have to worry as much about trading. Consequently, society would further reap the fruits
arising from the division of labor, as Adam Smith envisioned long ago.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Equations (8)-(9) imply Vm(y, Y )− V0(y, Y ) = u (Qm)µ (y, Y ) , where
µ (y, Y ) =
(1−M)p(Y )[1− p(y)]
r + (1−M)p(Y )[1− p(y)] < 1.
Suppose y = Y is a symmetric monetary equilibrium. Using (7), the equilibrium quantity, Qm (Y ),
must satisfy u (Qm)µ (Y )−c (Qm, Y ) = 0. It follows that (i) Qm is unique since, given Y, u(Qm)c(Qm,Y ) ∈
[0,∞) monotonically decreasing in Qm (intermediate value theorem); (ii) u (Qm) > c(Qm, Y ) since
µ (Y ) ∈ [0, 1); (iii) if Y ≥ 1−x or ifM = 1 then Qm = 0, since limY→1−x µ (Y ) = limM→1 µ (Y ) = 0
and c (0, Y ) = 0.
The function µ (Y ) falls in M, it is strictly concave in Y , on Y ∈ [0, 1− x), with maximum at
Y = max
©
0, 12 − x
ª
. When we let c (Q,Y ) = Q (1 + Y ) , then u (Q) /Q falls in Q since u0 (Q) −
u (Q) /Q < 0 (mean value theorem). Thus, Qm must satisfy
u(Qm)
Qm
− 1+Yµ(Y ) = 0 for all equilibrium
Y . It is easy to show that 1+Yµ(Y ) is strictly convex in Y . It follows that Qm (Y ) must be strictly
concave in Y with maximum at Y = min
©
0, 12 − x
ª
. In particular, taking the total differential of
u (Qm)µ (Y )− c (Qm, Y ) = 0, dQmdY = µ
0(Y )u(Qm)−Qm
(1+Y )(1−σ) .¥
Proof of Lemma 2. Let u(q) = qσ, σ ∈ (0, 1) , and c(q, y) = q(1 + y). An interior solution
{Q(y, Y ), q(y, Y )} must satisfy the two Þrst order conditions (sufficient and necessary since the
product of surpluses is concave in q and Q) given by (3). Divide the Þrst by the second equation
and observe that {Q(y, Y ), q(y, Y )} must solve
u0(Q)u0(q) = cq(q, y)cQ(Q,Y ) (18)
together with either one of the equalities in (3) generates (4). We omit the arguments, when no
confusion arises. Differentiating with respect to y:
qy(y, Y ) =
−q
(1−σ2)(1+y) < 0
Qy(y, Y ) = qy(y, Y ) · σ
³
1+y
1+Y
´ 1
1+σ
< 0.
(19)
Voluntary participation in bargaining requires: u(Q) − c(q, y) ≥ 0 and u(q) − c(Q,Y ) ≥ 0.
Using (4), it is easily seen that u(Q) ≥ c(q, y) and u(q) ≥ c(Q,Y ) always hold (the condition being
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σ ≤ 1). From (4) it follows that in equilibrium:
y < Y ⇒ q(y, Y ) > Q(y, Y ) > Q(Y )
y = Y ⇒Q(Y ) = q(y, Y ) = Q(y, Y )
y > Y ⇒Q(Y ) > Q(y, Y ) > q(y, Y )
Case M = 0, 1: barter equilibrium. Let y ∈ [0, 1− x] . Since p(Y ) > 0, the sign of Wy(y, Y ) =
p(Y )H(y, Y ) depends solely on the sign of H(y, Y ), where:
H(y, Y ) ≡ u(Q (y, Y ))− c(q (y, Y ) , y)− p(y)q (y, Y ) + p(y) £u0(Q)Qy − cq(q, y)qy¤ (20)
DeÞne T (y, Y ) ≡ u0(Q)Qy − cq(q, y)qy. Using (4)-(19):
T (y, Y ) =
1
1 + σ
·
σ1+σ
(1 + y)(1 + Y )σ
¸ 1
1−σ2
=
q(y, Y )
1 + σ
Ty(y, Y ) =
−T
(1− σ2)(1 + y) =
qy(y, Y )
1 + σ
and therefore
Wy(y, Y ) = p(Y )H(y, Y ) = p(Y )T (y, Y )
£
(1 + y)(1− σ2)− σ2(x+ y)¤ .
It is obvious that it is the sign of (1+y)(1−σ2)−σ2(x+y), a linear function in y, that determines
the sign of Wy(y, Y ). Note that (1 + y)(1 − σ2) − σ2(x + y) ≤ 0 iff σ ≥ h(y) ≡
q
1+y
1+x+2y , where
h(y0) < h(y) for y0 > y.
Now let y ∈ (1 − x, 1]. It is easy to show, that Wy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y. This is so since p0(y) = 0
and −p(y) [q (y, Y )− T (y, Y )] < 0. Hence, the individual would never differentiate her production
beyond 1− x.
Thus, from M = 0, 1 we will let Wy(y, Y ) be deÞned on (y, Y ) ∈ [0, 1 − x]2 with no loss in
generality. It follows that, given Y :
σ

≤ h(1− x) ⇒Wy(1− x, Y ) ≥ 0 ⇒Wy(y, Y ) > 0 ∀y
∈ (h(1− x), h(0)) ⇒ ∃ a unique y ∈ (0, 1− x) s.t.Wy(y, Y )

> 0 if y < y
= 0 if y = y
< 0 if y > y
≥ h(0) ⇒Wy(0, Y ) ≤ 0 ⇒Wy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y
(21)
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We note that y is a global maximum of W (y, Y ) since it is easily proved that H(y, Y ) = 0 ⇒
Hy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y ≤ y because Hy(y, Y ) = T (y,Y )σ
2[−2(1+y)(1−σ2)+x+y]
(1−σ2)(1+y) · Furthermore, one can show
that Hy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y when σ ≤ h(1− x).
Case M ∈ (0, 1) : monetary equilibrium. We must only consider Y ∈ [0, 1−x), so that Qm > 0.
For y ∈ [0, 1− x) equation (13) is:
Wy(y, Y ) = p(Y )
½
H(y, Y )−M(1−M)
·
u(Qm)− c(qm, y) + (1− p(y))
µ
(1 + y)
dqm
dy
+ qm
¶¸¾
(22)
since in equilibrium ∂[Vm(y,Y )−V0(y,Y )]∂y ≡ ∂c(qm(y,Y ),y)∂y = (1 + y)dqmdy + qm. Given Qm and Y, totally
differentiate (10) to obtain dqmdy =
u(Qm)µy(y,Y )−qm
1+y where
µy(y, Y ) ≡
∂µ (y, Y )
∂y
=
−rµ(y, Y )
[1− p(y)] [r + (1−M)p(Y )(1− p(y))]
Substituting c(qm, y) = u(Qm)µ(y, Y ) and
dqm
dy in (22) we obtain:
Wy(y, Y ) = p(Y ) [H(y, Y )− (1−M)MG(y, Y )] (23)
where G(y, Y ) ≡ r[1−µ(y,Y )]u(Qm)r+(1−M)p(Y )(1−p(y)) > 0. It is easily seen that ∂G(y,Y )∂y ≡ Gy(y, Y ) > 0 ∀y, Y.
Now let y ∈ (1 − x, 1]. It is easy to show that Wy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y since (i) H(y, Y ) < 0 and (ii)
G(y, Y ) = u (Qm) due to µ(y, Y ) = 0 for y ≥ 1−x. Hence, the individual would never differentiate
her production beyond 1− x. Thus, even when M > 0 we can consider Wy(y, Y ) for y ∈ [0, 1− x],
with no loss in generality.
It is immediate thatWy (y, Y ) differs from the case of a barter economy only due to the negative
term −(1−M)MG(y, Y ). It follows that
1. If σ ≥ h(0) then H(y, Y ) ≤ 0 ∀y. Since G(y, Y ) > 0, then Wy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y.
2. If h(1− x) < σ < h(0) then H(y, Y ) = 0 for a unique y ∈ (0, 1− x). Since Gy(y, Y ) > 0, and
Hy(y, Y ) < 0 it follows that (i) ifWy(0, Y ) ≤ 0 thenWy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y, and (ii) ifWy(0, Y ) > 0
then ∃ a unique y ∈ (0, y) such that Wy(y, Y ) = 0 with Wyy(y, Y ) < 0. Note that y < y since
G(y, Y ) > 0.
3. If σ ≤ h(1 − x) then H(y, Y ) ≥ 0 ∀y. Since Gy(y, Y ) > 0, and Hy(y, Y ) < 0 it follows that
(i) if Wy(0, Y ) ≤ 0 then Wy(y, Y ) < 0 ∀y, (ii) if Wy(0, Y ) > 0 and Wy(1− x, Y ) < 0 then ∃ a
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unique y ∈ (0, 1−x) such that Wy(y, Y ) = 0, with Wyy(y, Y ) < 0, (note that y < yb = 1−x)
and (iii) if Wy(1− x, Y ) ≥ 0 then Wy(y, Y ) > 0 ∀y.
Consequently, for a barter equilibrium when M = 0, 1, and for a monetary equilibrium when
M ∈ (0, 1), we will let Wy(y, Y ) be deÞned on (y, Y ) ∈ [0, 1− x]2 .¥
Proof of Lemma 3. Let u(q) = qσ, c(q, y) = q(1 + y), M ∈ {0, 1} and y = Y . Since p(Y ) > 0,
the sign of Wy(y, Y ) = p(Y )H(y, Y ) depends solely on the sign of H(y, Y ), where:
H(y, Y ) ≡ u(Q (y, Y ))− c(q (y, Y ) , y)− p(y)q (y, Y ) + p(y) £u0(Q)Qy − cq(q, y)qy¤
Using (14) and H(y, Y ):
Yb =

1− x ⇔ H (1− x) ≥ 0⇔ σ ≤ h(1− x)
Yb ⇔ H (yb) = 0⇔ h(1− x) < σ < h(0)
0 ⇔ H (0) ≤ 0⇔ σ ≥ h(0)
is the unique barter equilibrium in the presence of the hold-up problem.¥
Proof of Lemma 4. Let u(q) = qσ, c(q, y) = q(1+ y), M ∈ {0, 1} . Suppose ∂Ws(Y )∂Y < 0 ∀Y. Then
Y ∗b = 0 hence, Y
∗
b ≤ Yb. Next, suppose ∂Ws(Y )∂Y = 0 for a unique Y = Y ∗b . Then Y ∗b = Y ∗b , such
that u(Q( Y ∗b )) − c(Q( Y ∗b ), Y ∗b ) = p(
Y ∗b )cY (Q( Y
∗
b ),
Y ∗b )
2 (using (15) when M = 0). DeÞne T (y, Y ) ≡
u0(Q)Qy − cq(q, y)qy,which, using (4)-(19) is:
T (y, Y ) =
1
1 + σ
·
σ1+σ
(1 + y)(1 + Y )σ
¸ 1
1−σ2
=
q(y, Y )
1 + σ
Using H(y, Y ) and T (y, Y ) it follows that:
Wy(y, Y )|y=Y=Y ∗b = p( Y
∗
b )Q(
Y ∗b )
·
−1
2
+
1
1 + σ
¸
> 0
and Wy(y, Y )|y=Y > 0 ∀Y < Y ∗b . Hence, from Lemma 2, Yb > Y ∗b . Finally if ∂Ws(Y )∂Y > 0 ∀Y then
Y ∗b = 1 − x and u(Q) − c(Q,Y ) > p(Y )cY (Q,Y )2 ∀Y (from (16)). Hence, Wy(y, Y )|y=Y > 0 ∀Y and
Yb = Y
∗
b = 1− x.¥
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Proof of Lemma 5. Consider a symmetric monetary equilibrium y = Y = Ym. Let u(q) = qσ,
c(q, y) = q(1 + y), M ∈ (0, 1) and Y ∈ [0, 1− x). Use (23) and elements of the proof of Lemma 2
to consider three different cases.
Case σ ≥ h(0). Since H(Y ) < 0 ∀Y then Wy (Y ) < 0 ∀Y . Thus (14) implies existence of a
unique symmetric equilibrium Ym = 0.
Case h(1 − x) < σ < h(0). Since H (Y ) > 0 for Y < Yb, H( Yb) = 0, and H (Y ) < 0 for
Y > Yb, then Wy (Y ) < 0 for Y ≥ Yb, and so there are only two cases to consider. Either (i)
Wy (Y ) < 0 ∀Y < Yb [i.e. 0 ≤ H (Y ) < M(1−M)G (Y )], or (ii)Wy (Y ) = 0 for some Y < Yb [i.e.
0 < H (Y ) =M(1−M)G (Y )]:
 In case (i)Wy (Y ) < 0 ∀Y, and once again there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium Ym = 0.
 In case (ii) there can be an interior equilibrium, deÞned as any element of the set:
Ym ≡
n
Y ∈ [0, Yb)|H(Y ) =M (1−M)G (Y )
o
.
Note that Y < Yb because 0 = H( Yb) < M(1 −M)G( Yb). The intermediate value theorem
tells us that a sufficient condition for Ym to be non-empty is H(0) > M (1−M)G (0) , i.e.
Wy (0) > 0. A condition sufficient for Ym to be a singleton is
∂Wy(Y )
∂Y ≤ 0 ∀Y ∈ Ym (i.e.
Wy(Ym) is locally concave whenever it crosses zero, so W (Y ) has a unique maximum). Note
that ∂H(Y )∂Y < 0 when h(1− x) < σ < h(0). Thus, using continuity arguments, M > 0 small
is sufficient for existence of a unique Ym. It is easy to verify that ∂
Ym
∂x < 0. Furthermore, as
M → 0 then Ym → Y −b , thus by continuity ∂
Ym
∂M < 0 if M is sufficiently small.
Case σ ≤ h(1−x). Since H (Y ) ≥ 0 ∀Y, then either (i)Wy (Y ) < 0 ∀Y < 1−x [i.e. 0 < H (Y ) <
M(1−M)G (Y )], or (ii) Wy (Y ) = 0 for some Y < 1− x [i.e. 0 < H (Y ) =M(1−M)G (Y )]:
 In case (i)Wy (Y ) < 0 ∀Y, and once again there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium Ym = 0.
 In case (ii) there can be an interior equilibrium Ym = Ym. Following the procedure outlined
above, if M > 0 small then ∃ a unique Ym ∈ (0, 1 − x), such that ∂ Ym∂x < 0, limM→0 Ym =
Yb = 1− x, and ∂ Ym∂M < 0 for M small.
Thus: (i) If σ ≥ h(0) =
q
1
1+x then Ym = Yb = 0; (ii) If σ < h(0) then either Ym = 0 < Yb or
Ym = Ym < Yb.
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To prove that Ym → Yb as M → 1 and that ∂Ym∂M > 0 for M close to 1, note that Ym → Yb as
M → 1 since Qm → 0 (hence G(Y )→ 0). Since Ym ≤ Yb ∀M, then ∂Ym∂M > 0 for M close to 1.
To prove Ym is convex in M notice that if in equilibrium Ym is interior then Wy(Y )|Y=Ym = 0
which, using the implicit function theorem and (23), implies:
∂ Ym
∂M
= −(1− 2M)G(Y ) +M(1−M)
∂G(Y )
∂M
∂H(Y )
∂Y −M(1−M)∂G(Y )∂Y
¯̄̄̄
¯
Y=Ym
The numerator vanishes at most at one point since (i) ∂G(Y )∂M < 0, because
G(Y ) =
·
r
r + (1−M)p(Y )(1− p(Y ))
¸2µµ(Y )
1 + y
¶ σ
1−σ
and ∂µ(Y )∂M < 0 (from Lemma 1), and (ii) (1−2M)G(Y ) < 0 for allM < 12 . The numerator is always
negative since Ym must be a maximum, hence H(Y ) −M(1 −M)G(Y ) must be concave around
Ym. It follows that ∂
Ym
∂M = 0 at one point
M ∈ (0, 1/2), ∂ Ym∂M > 0 whenever M > M , and ∂
Ym
∂M < 0
for M < M .¥
Proof of Proposition 1. Let u(q) = qσ, c(q, y) = q(1 + y). The proof follows from the proof of
Lemma 5. Note that (i) if Yb = 0 is an equilibrium then Wy(Y ) < 0 ∀Y, so Ym = Yb = 0, (ii) if
Yb = 1 − x is an equilibrium then Ym < Yb (by Lemma 1), and (iii) if Yb = Yb is an equilibrium,
then either Ym = 0 or Ym = Ym ∈ [0, Yb) where Wy( Ym) = 0 and Ym < Yb.¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Let u(q) = qσ, c(q, y) = q(1+y). To show that Ym is generally inefficient
we exploit Lemma 4, in which we have proved that Yb ≥ Y ∗b . Recall that Ym → Yb and Y ∗m → Y ∗b
as M → 0+ and as M → 1−. Since (15) is continuous in M , it follows that Ym ≥ Y ∗m for M close
to zero and one.
To show that ∂W (
Ym)
∂M > 0 for M close to 0, note from the prior argument that Ym ≥ Y ∗m for M
around 0 and 1. Note that:
W (Ym) = rV0(Ym) + rM [Vm(Ym)− V0(Ym)]
=Ws(Y )|M=0,Y=Ym + rMc(Qm(Ym), Ym)
since rV0(Ym) = Ws(Ym)|M=0,1. We know that Ym = Yb for M = 0, 1, and Ym ≤ Yb ∀M, from
Proposition 1. Consider the case where Yb = Yb, and Ym = Ym for M > 0 small. In this case
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∂Ym
∂M < 0 for M small and
∂Ym
∂M > 0 for M large. From Lemma 4 note that
∂Ws(Y )
∂Y
¯̄̄
Y=Ym,M=0
< 0,
since Ws(Y ) is concave inY and Ym|M=0 = Yb > Y ∗b , because Y ∗b maximizes Ws(Y ). Therefore:
∂W ( Ym)
∂M
=
∂Ws( Ym)
∂ Ym
¯̄̄̄
¯
M=0
· ∂
Ym
∂M
+ r
"
c(Qm( Ym), Ym) +M
∂c(Qm( Ym), Ym)
∂M
#
By continuity, it follows that ∂W (
Ym)
∂M > 0 for M around 0: since Ws(Yb) = W (Ym) from M = 0
it follows that, welfare in the monetary economy cannot be below welfare in the barter economy,
for M close to 0. It also follows that ∂W (
Ym)
∂M < 0 for M around 1 since Qm → 0, ∂
Ym
∂M > 0, and
as M → 1 then Ym → Yb > Y ∗b so that ∂
Ym
∂M → 0. Thus welfare in the monetary economy is above
welfare in the barter economy, for M close to 1, since W ( Ym)|M=1 =W ( Yb)|M=1.¥
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Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Equilibrium Specialization: Barter
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